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Alex Bryson, John Forth and Richard Freeman present research into the benefits of all-employee stock
purchase plans. They find that employees who joined the plan were more committed to the firm,
more satisfied with their jobs and behaved in ways which were productivity-enhancing, namely
working longer hours and taking less sickness absence.
Across Britain around half of all listed firms run some kind of all-employee stock purchase plan
(ESPP). These offer workers the opportunity to buy shares in the firm at discounted rates. But why
do firms do this, and what do they hope to get out of them? Perhaps they are just a tax-efficient way
of paying workers? In Britain government subsidises these schemes – known as Share Incentive
Plans, or SIPs – through tax breaks offered both to the employee (low or zero tax on gains from
share trading) and the employer (in the tax treatment of the shares firms offer to employees to
match their own purchased shares). But multi-national firms offering ESPP in Britain are
increasingly likely to offer them elsewhere, even when their tax treatment is less favourable. This is
not the whole story.
A second possible explanation for the popularity of ESPP’s is that firms have a hunch that they are
the “right thing to do”, either because they want to share the rewards from the firm’s good
performance; they are eager to engender a culture of inclusiveness and “engagement”, as
promoted by policy-makers and business gurus; or because senior executives see a fit between the
ethos behind ESPP’s and what they are trying to achieve as a business. When you ask CEOs why
they introduced an ESPP they often use this sort of language in explaining their motivations. And
when you ask their employees why they think the firm introduced the plan they tend to confirm what
their bosses say – whether they have actually joined the plan or not.
Table 1 presents evidence from a recent study we undertook among employees in a multinational service sector
firm offering an ESPP, which we call ShareCo. Seven-in-ten employees say the company offered it “to make me feel
part of the firm”, while six-in-ten said it was “to keep me with the company longer”.
Table 1: Employee Views on Why The Firm Introduced the ESPP
Reason: Non-member Member All
To build team spirit 30 33 31
To make me work harder 31 35 33
To keep me with the company longer 53 65 58
To make me feel part of the firm 68 74 71
As a gift 8 10 9
Because other companies do it 33 33 33
So I can vote on how the company is run 14 11 13
Other 7 6 6
Source: Bryson and Forth, 2014
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If we think of the economics here these responses are not wholly satisfactory. Imagine two counterfactual worlds,
one in which ShareCo offers an ESPP and one in which ShareCo does not offer an ESPP. All else in the world is
constant. In the world in which ShareCo offers the plan it incurs some costs. There are some direct costs, such as
those related to administering the scheme, and the costs incurred in matching the shares purchased by employees.
There are some opportunity costs – what else could the company have done with the money spent on the scheme?
And there are potential and quite substantial indirect costs. For example, shareholders may balk at the prospect of
diluting the company ownership base by divesting ownership to employees. These employees are also able to share
in employee profits in a way that might not otherwise happen. These two issues – diversifying ownership and
limiting the value of holding stock – may act as a disincentive for external traders to hold ShareCo stock or, if they
do, will limit the price attached to that stock. One might even imagine – as Robert Gordon did some time ago – that
corporate stock holders face disincentives to invest in the firm’s capital when some of that investment is recouped by
the employees.
In the light of these potential dangers in offering stock to employees under an ESPP, why do so many firms choose
to do so?  One possibility is that the benefits described in Table 1 translate into an income flow that exceeds – or at
least balances – the costs of the plan to the firm. Our recent ShareCo study suggests this is indeed a possibility for
two reasons: ESPP participation is associated with attitudes and behaviours which are pro-productive and there is a
perception that the presence of an ESPP attracts more talented job applicants. In other words, ESPPs seem to
accomplish the two objectives set by most incentive plans, as discussed by Ed Lazear and others.
How did these benefits show up in our survey? First, the study found that, when compared to observationally
equivalent non-members of the Plan, employees who joined the plan were more committed to the firm, more
satisfied with their jobs – a trait linked to higher workplace-level productivity – and behaved in ways which were
productivity-enhancing, namely working longer hours and taking less sickness absence.
Table 2: What Effect Did the Plan Have?
Extent to which Plan: Non-member Member All
Increases your motivation:
Some extent
Great extent
24
3
47
9
34
6
Increases motivation of other employees:
Some extent
Great extent
31
4
43
5
36
4
Reduces the chance you will leave the firm:
Some extent
Great extent
21
5
40
11
29
7
Reduces the chance others will leave the firm:
Some extent
Great extent
29
4
41
5
34
4
Attracts talented people:
Some extent
Great extent
28
4
35
5
31
5
Makes it more likely you’ll recommend the company to others:
Some extent
Great extent
28
6
46
9
35
8
Source: Bryson and Forth, 2014
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Although it was difficult in our study to establish whether the link between plan membership and productive
behaviours was a causal one, a majority of members said that membership increased their motivation, while almost
half also thought it increased the motivation of others (Table 2). There is also some evidence of a positive spillover of
the plan to non-members who thought their own motivation was positively influenced by the plan members around
them. Over one-third of employees also thought that an ESPP was likely to attract talented people to the company,
in keeping with the idea that firms with plans can attract more productive applicants than might be possible in the
absence of a plan.
Of course, even if ESPPs can increase labour productivity via incentives and worker sorting, the gains need to be
sizeable to meet the additional costs incurred by running such a scheme. In our previous work and the work of
others both in Britain and the United States, there is evidence that these effects do translate into higher workplace
and firm performance.
How does it work?
We have established that many large listed firms adopt ESPPs, and that they appear to be behaving rationally in
doing so, in the sense that they benefit from their adoption. But how do these ESPPs actually work? In a paper just
released, we argue that ESPP’s are a hybrid between a form of gift exchange, on the one hand, and an incentive
contract on the other. The discounted rate creates a gift exchange, where the firm hopes that workers who accept
the gift reciprocate with greater loyalty and effort.  But ESPPs diverge from standard gift exchange or efficiency
wage models. Employees have to invest some of their own money by purchasing shares at the discounted rate to
accept the gift. A sizeable number choose to reject the gift. In addition, the value of the ESPP gift varies with the
share price and thus with the performance of the firm and the effort of workers in total. For workers who buy
subsidized shares, an ESPP sets up a group incentive pay system analogous to profit sharing, all-employee stock
options, or an employment ownership scheme that makes part of workers’ compensation depend on company
performance.
Using data from the UK establishments of ShareCo we compared the workplace behaviour of employees who join
the ESPP with that of observationally equivalent workers who do not join the plan. We find that workers who
purchase shares at subsidized prices work harder for longer hours and have lower quit and absence rates than
workers who do not join the plan.  We also find perceptions of peers’ plan participation influences workers’
behaviour. What is particularly intriguing is that ESPP joiners socialise more with colleagues outside work than non-
joiners: this greater sense of social identity with colleagues, predicted under some gift exchange models, lowers
their costs of work effort and may explain why they are more productive than those who do not join the ESPP. These
findings highlight the distinct place of subsidized share purchase schemes in the spectrum of gift exchange and
group incentive pay systems.
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